| 5. QUOD, SICUT ILLA EST PER SE ET ALIA PER ILLAM, ITA SIT EX SE ET ALIA EX ILLA.
| 5. Just as this [Nature] exists through itself (per se) and [all] other things exist through it, so it exists from itself (ex se) and [all] other things exist from it.
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| Quoniam itaque places quod inventum est, ivuat indagare, utrum haec ipsa natura et cuncta quae aliquid sunt, non sint nisi ex ipsa, quemadmodum non sunt nisi per ipsam.
| Seeing, then, that the truth already discovered has been satisfactorily demonstrated, it is profitable to examine whether this Nature, and all things that have any existence, derive existence from no other source than it, just as they do not exist except through it.
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| Sed liquet posse dici quia quod est ex aliquo, est etiam per id ipsum, et quod est per aliquid, est etiam ex eo ipso, quemadmodum quod est ex materia et per artificem, potest etiam dici esse per materiam et ex artifice, quondam per utrumque et ex utroque, id est ab utroque habet ut sit, quamvis aliter sit per materiam et ex materia, quam per artificem et ex artifice.
| But it is clear that one may say, that what derives existence from something exists through the same thing; and what exists through something also derives existence from it. For instance, what derives existence from matter, and exists through the artificer, may also be said to exist through matter, and to derive existence from the artificer, since it exists through both, and derives existence from both. That is, it is endowed with existence by both, although it exists through matter and from the artificer in another sense than that in which it exists through, and from, the artificer.
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| Consequitur ergo ut, quomodo cuncta quae sunt per summam sunt naturam id quod sunt, et ideo illa est per seipsam, alii vero per aliud: ita omnia quae sunt sint ex eadem summa natura, et idcirco sit illa ex seipsa, alia autem ex alto.
| It follows, then, that just as all existing beings are what they are, through the supreme Nature, and as that Nature exists through itself, but other beings through another than themselves, so all existing beings derive existence from this supreme Nature. And therefore, this Nature derives existence from itself, but other beings from it.
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| 6. QUOD ILLA NON SIT ULLA IUVANTE CAUSA DUCTA AD ESSE, NEC TAMEN SIT PER NIHIL AUT EX NIHILO; ET QUOMODO INTELLIGI POSSIT ESSE PER SE ET EX SE.
| 6. This Nature was not brought into existence through any assisting cause. Nevertheless, it does not exist through nothing or from nothing. How it can be understood to exist through itself and from itself.
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| Quoniam igitur non semper eundem habet sensum, quod dicitur esse per aliquid aut esse ex aliquo, quaerendum est diligentius, quomodo per summam naturam vel ex ipsa sint omnia quae sunt. Et quondam id quod est per seipsum, et id quod est per aliud, non eandem suscipiont existendi rationem, prius separatim videatur de ipsa summa natura euae per se est, postea de ifs quae per aliud sunt.
| Since the same meaning is not always attached to the phrase, "existence through” something, or, to the phrase, "existence derived from” something, very diligent inquiry must be made, in what way all existing beings exist through the supreme Nature, or derive existence from it. For, what exists through itself, and what exists through another, do not admit the same ground of existence. Let us first consider, separately, this supreme Nature, which exists through self; then these beings which exist through another.
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| Cum igitur constet quia illa est per seipsam quidquid est, et omnia /19/ alia sunt per illam id quod sunt: quomodo est ipsa per se? Quod enim dicitur esse per aliquid, videtur esse aut per efficiens aut per materiam aut per aliquod aliud adiumentum, velut per instrumentum. Sed quidquid aliquo ex his tribus modis est: per aliud est et posterius, et aliquomodo minus est eo, per quod habet ut sit.
| Since it is evident, then, that this Nature is whatever it is, through itself, and all other beings are what they are, through it, how does it exist through itself? For, what is said to exist through anything apparently exists through an efficient agent, or through matter, or through some other external aid, as through some instrument. But, whatever exists in any of these three ways exists through another than itself, and is of later existence, and, in some sort, less than that through which it obtains existence.
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| At summa natura nullatenus est per aliud nec est posterior aut minor seipsa aut aliqua alia re. Quare summa natura nec a se nec ab alio fieri potuit, nec ipsa sibi nec aliud aliquid illi materia unde fieret fuit, aut ipsa se aliquomodo aut aliqua res illam, ut esset quod non erat, adivuit.
| But, in no wise does the supreme Nature exist through another, nor is it later or less than itself or anything else. Therefore, the supreme Nature could be created neither by itself, nor by another; nor could itself or any other be the matter whence it should be created; nor did it assist itself in any way; nor did anything assist it to be what it was not before.
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| Quid igitur? Quod enim non est, a quo faciente aut ex qua materia aut quibus adiumentis ad esse peruenerit: id videtur aut esse nihil, aut si aliquid est, per nihil esse et ex nihilo. Quae licet ex iis, quae rationis luce de summa iam animadverti substantia, putem nullatenus in illam posse cadere, non tamen negligam huius rei probationem contexere.
| What is to be inferred? For that which cannot have come into existence by any creative agent, or from any matter, or with any external aids, seems either to be nothing, or, if it has any existence, to exist through nothing, and derive existence from nothing. And although, in accordance with the observations I have already made, in the light of reason, regarding the supreme Substance, I should think such propositions could in no wise be true in the case of supreme Substance; yet, I would not neglect to give a connected demonstration of this matter.
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| Quoniam namque ad magnum et delectabile quiddam me subito perduxit haec mea meditatio, nullam vel simplicem pacneque fatuam obiectionem disputanti mihi occurrentem negligendo volo praeterire. Quatenus et ego nihil ambiguum in praecedentibus relinquens certior ualeam ad sequentia procedere, et si cui forte quod speculor persuadere voluero, omni vel modico remoto obstaculo quilibet tardus intellectus ad audita facile possit accedere.
| For, seeing that this my meditation has suddenly brought me to an important and interesting point, I am unwilling to pass over carelessly even any simple or almost foolish objection that occurs to me, in my argument; in order that by leaving no ambiguity in my discussion up to this point, I may have the better assured strength to advance toward what follows; and in order that if, perchance, I shall wish to convince any one of the truth of my speculations, even one of the slower minds, through the removal of every obstacle, however slight, may acquiesce in what it finds here.
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| Quod igitur illa natura, sine qua nulla est natura, sit nihil, tam falsum est quam absurdum erit, si dicatur quidquid est nihil esse. Per nihil vero non est, quia nullo modo intelligi potest, ut quod aliquid est, sit per nihil. At si quomodo est ex nihilo: aut per se, aut per aliud, aut per nihil est ex nihilo. Sed constat quia nullo modo aliquid est per nihil. Si igitur est aliquomodo ex nihilo: aut per se aut per aliud est ex nihilo.
| That this Nature, then, without which no nature exists, is nothing, is as false as it would be absurd to say that whatever is is nothing. And, moreover, it does not exist through nothing, because it is utterly inconceivable that what is something should exist through nothing. But, if in any way it derives existence from nothing, it does so through itself, or through another, or through nothing. But it is evident that in no wise does anything exist through nothing. If, then, in any way it derives existence from nothing, it does so either through itself or through another.
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| Per se autem nihil potest esse ex nihilo, quia si quid est ex nihilo per aliquid, necesse est, ut id per quod est prius sit. Quoniam igitur haec essentia prior seipsa non est, nullo modo est ex nihilo per se.
| But nothing can, through itself, derive existence from nothing, because if anything derives existence from nothing, through something, then that through which it exists must exist before it. Seeing that this Being, then, does not exist before itself, by no means does it derive existence from itself.
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| At si dicitur per aliam aliquam naturam extitisse ex nihilo, non est summa omnium sed aliquo inferior; nec est per se hoc quod est sed per aliud.
| But if it is supposed to have derived existence from some other nature, then it is not the supreme Nature, but some inferior one, nor is it what it is through itself, but through another.
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| Item si per aliquid est ipsa ex nihilo: id per quod est, magnum bonum fuit, cum /20/ causa tanti boni fuit. At nullum bonum potest intelligi ante illud bonum, sine quo nihil est bonum. Hoc autem bonum, sine quo nullum est bonum, satis liquet hanc esse summam naturam, de qua agitur. Quare nulla res uel intellectu praecessit, per quam ista ex nihilo esset.
| Again: if this Nature derives existence from nothing, through something, that through which it exists was a great good, since it was the cause of good. But no good can be understood as existing before that good, without which nothing is good; and it is sufficiently clear that this good, without which there is no good, is the supreme Nature which is under discussion. Therefore, it is not even conceivable that this Nature was preceded by any being, through which it derived existence from nothing.
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| Denique si haec ipsa natura est aliquid aut per nihil aut ex nihilo: procul dubio aut ipsa non est per se et ex se quidquid est, aut ipsa dicitur nihil. Quod utrumque superfluum est exponere, quam falsum sit. Licet igitur summa substantia non sit per aliquid efficiens aut ex aliqua materia nec aliquibus sit adiuta causis ut ad esse perduceretur: nullatenus tamen est per nihil aut ex nihilo, quia per seipsam et ex seipsa est quidquid est.
| Hence, if it has any existence through nothing, or derives existence from nothing, there is no doubt that either, whatever it is, it does not exist through itself, or derive existence from itself, or else it is itself nothing. It is unnecessary to show that both these suppositions are false. The supreme Substance, then, does not exist through any efficient agent, and does not derive existence from any matter, and was not aided in being brought into existence by any external causes. Nevertheless, it by no means exists through nothing, or derives existence from nothing; since, through itself and from itself, it is whatever it is.
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| Quomodo ergo tandem esse intelligenda est per se et ex se, si nec ipsa se fecit, nec ipsa sibi materia extitit, nec ipsa se quolibet modo, ut quod non erat esset, adivuit? Nisi forte eo modo intelligendum uidetur, quo dicitur quia lux lucet vel lucens est per seipsam et ex seipsa. Quemadmodum enim sese habent ad invicem lux et lucere et lucens, sic sunt ad se invicem essentia et esse et ens, hoc est existens sive subsistens. Ergo summa essentia et summe esse et summe ens, id est summe existens sive summe subsistens, non dissimiliter sibi convenient, quam lux et lucere et lucens.
| Finally, as to how it should be understood to exist through itself, and to derive existence from itself: it did not create itself, nor did it spring up as its own matter, nor did it in any way assist itself to become what it was not before, unless, haply, it seems best to conceive of this subject in the way in which one says that the light lights or is lucent, through and from itself. For, as are the mutual relations of the light and to light and lucent (lux, lucere, lucens), such are the relations of essence, and to be and being, that is, existing or subsisting. So the supreme Being, and to be in the highest degree, and being in the highest degree, bear much the same relations, one to another, as the light and to light and lucent.
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| 7. QUOMODO OMNIA ALIA SINT PER ILLAM ET EX ILLA.
| 7. How all other things exist through and from this [Nature].
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| Restat nunc de rerum earum universitate, quae per aliud sunt, discutere, quomodo sint per summam substantiam: utrum quia ipsa fecit universa, aut quia materia fuit universorum. Non enim opus est quaerere, utrum ideo sint universa per ipsam, quia alio faciente aut alia materia existente illa tantum quolibet modo ut res omnes essent adivuerit, cum repugnet iis quae iam supra patuerunt, si secundo loco et non principaliter sint per ipsam quaecumque sunt.
| There now remains the discussion of that whole class of beings that exist through another, as to how they exist through the supreme Substance, whether because this Substance created them all, or because it was the material of all. For, there is no need to inquire whether all exist through it, for this reason, namely, that there being another creative agent, or another existing material, this supreme Substance has merely aided in bringing about the existence of all things: since it is inconsistent with what has already been shown, that whatever things are should exist secondarily, and not primarily, through it.
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| Primum itaque mihi quaerendum esse puto, utrum universitas rerum, quae per aliud sunt, sit ex aliqua materia. Non autem dubito omnem hanc /21/ mundi molem cum partibus suis sicut videmus formatam, constare ex terra et aqua et aere et igne, quae scilicet quattuor elementa aliquomodo intelligi possunt sine his formis quas conspicimus in rebus formatis, ut eorum informis aut etiam confusa natura videatur esse materia omnium corporum suis formis discretorum; non inquam hoc dubito sed quaero, unde haec ipsa quam dixi mundanae molis materia sit. Nam si huius materiae est aliqua materia, illa verius est corporeae universitatis materia.
| First, then, it seems to me, we ought to inquire whether that whole class of beings which exist through another derive existence from any material. But I do not doubt that all this solid world, with its parts, just as we see, consists of earth, water, fire, and air. These four elements, of course, can be conceived of without these forms which we see in actual objects, so that their formless, or even confused, nature appears to be the material of all bodies, distinguished by their own forms.—I say that I do not doubt this. But I ask, whence this very material that I have mentioned, the material of the mundane mass, derives its existence. For, if there is some material of this material, then that is more truly the material of the physical universe.
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| Si igitur universitas rerum, seu visibilium seu invisibilium, est ex aliqua materia: profecto non solum non potest esse sed nec dici potest esse ex alia materia quam ex summa natura, aut ex seipsa, aut ex aliqua tertia essentia, quae utique nulla est. Quippe nihil omnino vel cogitari potest esse praeter illud summum omnium, quod est per seipsum, et universitatem eorum, quae non per se sed per idem summum sunt.
| If, then, the universe of things, whether visible or invisible, derives existence from any material, certainly it not only cannot be, but it cannot even be supposed to be, from any other material than from the supreme Nature or from itself, or from some third being—but this last, at any rate, does not exist. For, indeed, nothing is even conceivable except that highest of all beings, which exists through itself, and the universe of beings which exist, not through themselves, but through this supreme Being.
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| Quare quod nullo modo aliquid est, nullius rei materia est.
| Hence, that which has no existence at all is not the material of anything.
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| Ex sua vero natura rerum universitas, quae per se non est, esse non potest; quoniam si hoc esset, aliquomodo esset per se et per aliud quam per id per quod sunt cuncta, et non esset solum id per quod cuncta sunt; quae omnia falsa sunt.
| From its own nature the universe cannot derive existence, since, if this were the case, it would in some sort exist through itself and so through another than that through which all things exist. But all these suppositions are false.
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| Item omne quod ex materia est, ex alio est et eo posterius. Quoniam igitur nihil est aliud a seipso vel posterius seipso, consequitur ut nihil sit materialiter ex seipso.
| Again, everything that derives existence from material derives existence from another, and exists later than that other. Therefore, since nothing is other than itself, or later than itself, it follows that nothing derives material existence from itself.
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| At si ex summae naturae materia potest esse aliquid minus ipsa, summum bonum mutari et corrumpi potest; quod nefas est dicere. Quapropter quoniam omne quod aliud est quam ipsa, minus est ipsa, impossibile est aliquid aliud hoc modo esse ex ipsa.
| But if, from the material of the supreme Nature itself, any lesser being can derive existence, the supreme good is subject to change and corruption. But this it is impious to suppose. Hence, since everything that is other than this supreme Nature is less than it, it is impossible that anything other than it in this way derives existence from it.
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| Amplius. Dubium non est, quia nullatenus est bonum, per quod mutatur vel corrumpitur summum bonum. Quod si qua minor natura est ex summi boni materia: cum nihil sit undecumque nisi per summam essentiam, mutatur et corrumpitur summum bonum per ipsam. Quare summa essentia, quae est ipsum summum bonum, nullatenus est bonum; quod est inconveniens. Nulla igitur minor natura materialiter est ex summa natura.
| Furthermore: doubtless that is in no wise good, through which the supreme good is subjected to change or corruption. But, if any lesser nature derives existence from the material of the supreme good, inasmuch as nothing exists whencesoever, except through the supreme Being, the supreme good is subjected to change and corruption through the supreme Being itself. Hence, the supreme Being, which is itself the supreme good, is by no means good; which is a contradiction. There is, therefore, no lesser nature which derives existence in a material way from the supreme Nature.
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| Cum igitur eorum essentiam, quae per aliud sunt, constet non esse velut ex materia ex summa essentia, nec ex se nec ex alio: manifestum est quia ex nulla materia est.
| Since, then, it is evident that the essence of those things which exist through another does not derive existence as if materially, from the supreme Essence, nor from itself, nor from another, it is manifest that it derives existence from no material.
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| Quare quoniam quidquid est, per summam essentiam est, nec per ipsam aliud aliquid esse potest nisi ea aut faciente aut materia existente, /22/ consequitur ex necessitate, ut praeter ipsam nihil sit nisi ea faciente. Et quoniam nihil aliud est vel fuit nisi illa et quae facta sunt ab illa, nihil omnino facere potuit per aliud vel instrumentum uel adiumentum quam per seipsam. At omne quod fecit, sine dubio aut fecit ex aliquo velut ex materia, aut ex nihilo.
| Hence, seeing that whatever is exists through the supreme Being, nor can aught else exist through this Being, except by its creation, or by its existence as material, it follows, necessarily, that nothing besides it exists, except by its creation. And, since nothing else is or has been, except that supreme Being and the beings created by it, it could create nothing at all through any other instrument or aid than itself. But all that it has created, it has doubtless created either from something, as from material, or from nothing.
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| Quoniam ergo certissime patet quia essentia omnium, quae praeter summam essentiam sunt, ab eadem summa essentia facta est, et quia ex nulla materia est: procul dubio nihil apertius quam quia illa summa essentia tantam rerum molem, tam numerosam multitudinem, tam fomnose formatam, tam ordinate uariatam, tam convenienter diversam sola per seipsam produxit ex nihilo.
| Since, then, it is most patent that the essence of all beings, except the supreme Essence, was created by that supreme Essence, and derives existence from no material, doubtless nothing can be more clear than that this supreme Essence nevertheless produced from nothing, alone and through itself, the world of material things, so numerous a multitude, formed in such beauty, varied in such order, so fitly diversified.
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| 8. QUOMODO INTELLIGENDUM SIT, QUIA FECIT OMNIA EX NIHILO.
| 8. How "[This Nature] made all things from nothing” is to be construed.
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| Sed occurrit quiddam de nihilo. Nam ex quocumque fit aliquid, id causa est eius quod ex se fit, et omnis causa necesse est aliquod ad essentiam effecti pracbeat adiumentum. Quod sic omnes tenent experimento, ut et nulli rapiatur contendendo, et vix ulli surripiatur decipiendo.
| But we are confronted with a doubt regarding this term nothing. For, from whatever source anything is created, that source is the cause of what is created from it, and, necessarily, every cause affords some assistance to the being of what it effects. This is so firmly believed, as a result of experience, by every one, that the belief can be wrested from no one by argument, and can scarcely be purloined by sophistry.
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| Si ergo factum est ex nihilo aliquid, ipsum nihil causa fuit eius quod ex ipso factum est. Sed quomodo id quod nullum habebat esse, adivuit aliquid, ut perveniret ad esse? Si autem nullum adiumentum de nihilo provenit ad aliquid: cui aut qualiter persuadeatur, quia ex nihilo aliquid efficiatur?
| Accordingly, if anything was created from nothing, this very nothing was the cause of what was created from it. But how could that which had no existence, assist anything in coming into existence? If, however, no aid to the existence of anything ever had its source in nothing, who can be convinced, and how, that anything is created out of nothing?
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| Praeterea 'nihil' aut significat aliquid aut non significat aliquid. Sed si: nihil est aliquid: quaecumque facta sunt ex nihilo, facta sunt ex aliquo. Si vero nihil non est aliquid: quoniam intelligi non potest ut ex eo quod penitus non est, fiat aliquid, nihil fit ex nihilo, sicut vox omnium est: quia de nihilo nihil. Unde videtur sonsequi ut quidquid fit, fiat ex aliquo. Aut enim fit de aliquo, aut de nihilo. Sive igitur nihil sit aliquid, sive nihil non sit aliquid, consequi uidetur ut quidquid factum est, factum sit ex aliquo.
| Moreover, nothing either means something, or does not mean something. But if nothing is something, whatever has been created from nothing has been created from something. If, however, nothing is not something; since it is inconceivable that anything should be created from what does not exist, nothing is created from nothing; just as all agree that nothing comes from nothing. Whence, it evidently follows, that whatever is created is created from something; for it is created either from something or from nothing. Whether, then, nothing is something, or nothing is not something, it apparently follows, that whatever has been created was created from something.
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| Quod si verum esse ponitur, omnibus quae supra disposita sunt, opponitur. Unde quoniam quod erat nihil, aliquid erit: id quod maxime erat aliquid, nihil erit. Ex eo namque quod quandam substantiam maxime omnium existentem inveneram, ad hoc ut omnia alia sic facta essent ab ea, ut nihil esset unde facta essent, ratiocinando perueneram. Quare si illud /23/ unde facta sunt, quod putabam esse nihil, est aliquid: quidquid inventum aestimabam de summa essentia, est nihil.
| But, if this is posited as a truth, then it is so posited in opposition to the whole argument propounded in the preceding chapter. Hence, since what was nothing will thus be something, that which was something in the highest degree will be nothing. For, from the discovery of a certain Substance existing in the greatest degree of all existing beings, my reasoning had brought me to this conclusion, that all other beings were so created by this Substance, that that from which they were created was nothing. Hence, if that from which they were created, which I supposed to be nothing, is something, whatever I supposed to have been ascertained regarding the supreme Being, is nothing.
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| Quid igitur intelligendum est de nihilo? Nam nihil quod videam obici posse vel paene fatoum, iam statui in hac meditatione negligere. Tribus itaque ut puto modis, quod ad praesentis impedimenti sufficit expedimentum, exponi potest, si qua substantia dicitur esse facta ex nihilo.
| What, then, is to be our understanding of the term nothing?—For I have already determined not to neglect in this meditation any possible objection, even if it be almost foolish.—In three ways, then—and this suffices for the removal of the present obstacle—can the statement that any substance was created from nothing be explained.
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| Unus quidem modus est, quo volumus intelligi penitus non esse factum, quod factum dicitur ex nihilo. Cui simile est, cum quaerenti de tacente unde loquatur, respondetur: de nihilo; id est: non loquitur. Secundum quem modum de ipsa summa essentia et de eo quod penitus nec fuit nec est, quaerenti unde factum sit, recte responderi potest: de nihilo; id est: nequaquam factum est. Qui sensus de nullo eorum quae facta sunt, intelligi potest.
| There is one way, according to which we wish it to be understood, that what is said to have been created from nothing has not been created at all; just as, to one who asks regarding a dumb man, of what he speaks, the answer is given, "of nothing,” that is, he does not speak at all. According to this interpretation, to one who enquires regarding the supreme Being, or regarding what never has existed and does not exist at all, as to whence it was created, the answer, "from nothing” may properly be given; that is, it never was created. But this answer is unintelligible in the case of any of those things that actually were created.
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| Alia significatio est, quae dici quidem potest, vera tamen esse non potest; ut si dicatur aliquid sic esse factum ex nihilo, ut ex ipso nihilo, id est ex eo quod penitus non est, factum sit; quasi ipsum nihil sit aliquid existens, ex quo possit aliquid fieri. Quod quoniam semper falsum est: quotiens esse ponitur, impossibilis inconvenientia consequitur.
| There is another interpretation which is, indeed, capable of supposition, but cannot be true; namely, that if anything is said to have been created from nothing, it was created from nothing itself (de nihilo ipso), that is, from what does not exist at all, as if this very nothing were some existent being, from which something could be created. But, since this is always false, as often as it is assumed an irreconcilable contradiction follows.
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| Tertia interpretatio qua dicitur aliquid esse factum de nihilo, est cum intelligimus esse quidem factum sed non esse aliquid unde sit factum. Per similem significationem dici videtur, cum homo contristatus sine causa dicitur contristatus de nihilo.
| There is a third interpretation, according to which a thing is said to have been created from nothing, when we understand that it was indeed created, but that there is not anything whence it was created. Apparently it is said with a like meaning, when a man is afflicted without cause, that he is afflicted "over nothing.”
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| Secundum igitur hunc sensum si intelligatur quod supra conclusum est, quia praeter summam essentiam cuncta quae sunt, ab eadem ex nihilo facta sunt, id est non ex aliquo: sicut ipsa conclusio praecedentia convenienter consequetur, ita ex eadem conclusione nihil inconveniens subsequetur. Quamvis non inconvenienter et sine omni repugnantia ea quae facta sunt a creatrice substantia, dici possint esse facta ex nihilo, eo modo quo dici solet dives ex paupere, et recepisse quis sanitatem ex aegritudine. Id est: qui prius pauper erat, nunc est dives, quod antea non erat; et qui prius habebat aegritudinem, nunc habet sanitatem, quam antea non habebat.
| If, then, the conclusion reached in the preceding chapter is understood in this sense, that with the exception of the supreme Being all things have been created by that Being from nothing, that is, not from anything; just as this conclusion consistently follows the preceding arguments, so, from it, nothing inconsistent is inferred; although it may be said, without inconsistency or any contradiction, that what has been created by the creative Substance was created from nothing, in the way that one frequently says a rich man has been made from a poor man, or that one has recovered health from sickness; that is, he who was poor before, is rich now, as he was not before; and he who was ill before, is well now, as he was not before.
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| Hoc igitur modo non inconvenienter intelligi potest, si dicitur creatrix essentia universa fecisse de nihilo, sive quod universa per illam facta sint de nihilo; id est: quae prius nihil erant, nunc sunt aliquid. Hac ipsa quippe /24/ voce qua dicitur: quia illa fecit, sive: quia ista facta sunt, intelligitur: quia cum illa fecit, aliquid fecit, et: cum ista facta sunt, nonnisi aliquid facta sunt. Sic enim aspicientes aliquem de ualde humili fortuna multis opibus ab aliquo honoribusue exaltatum dicimus: ecce fecit ille istum de nihilo, aut: factus est iste ab illo de nihilo; id est: iste qui prius quasi nihilum deputabatur, nunc illo faciente vere aliquid existimatur.
| In this way, then, we can understand, without inconsistency, the statement that the creative Being created all things from nothing, or that all were created through it from nothing; that is, those things which before were nothing, are now something. For, indeed, from the very word that we use, saying that it created them or that they were created, we understand that when this Being created them, it created something, and that when they were created, they were created only as something. For so, beholding a man of very lowly fortunes exalted with many riches and honors by some one, we say, "Lo, he has made that man out of nothing”; that is, the man who was before reputed as nothing is now, by virtue of that other’s making, truly reckoned as something.
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| 9. QUOD EA QUAE FACTA SUNT DE NIHILO, NON NIHIL ERANT, ANTEQUAM FIERENT, QUANTUM AD RATIONEM FACIENTIS.
| 9. Before their creation those things which have been made from nothing were not nothing with respect to their Maker's reason.
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| Verum videor mihi videre quiddam, quod non negligenter discernere cogit, secundum quid ea quae facta sunt, antequam fierent, dici possint fuisse nihil. Nullo namque pacto fieri potest aliquid rationabiliter ab aliquo, nisi in facientis ratione praecedat aliquod rei faciendae quasi exemplum, sive aptius dicitur forma, vel similitudo, aut regula. Patet itaque, quoniam priusquam fierent universa, erat in ratione summae naturae, quid aut qualia aut quomodo futura essent.
| But I seem to see a truth that compels me to distinguish carefully in what sense those things which were created may be said to have been nothing before their creation. For, in no wise can anything conceivably be created by any, unless there is, in the mind of the creative agent, some example, as it were, or (as is more fittingly supposed) some model, or likeness, or rule. It is evident, then, that before the world was created, it was in the thought of the supreme Nature, what, and of what sort, and how, it should be.
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| Quare cum ea quae facta sunt, clarum sit nihil fuisse, antequam fierent, quantum ad hoc quia non erant quod nunc sunt, nec erat ex quo fierent: non tamen nihil erant quantum ad rationem facientis, per quam et secundum quam fierent.
| Hence, although it is clear that the being that were created were nothing before their creation, to this extent, that they were not what they now are, nor was there anything whence they should be created, yet they were not nothing, so far as the creator’s thought is concerned, through which, and according to which, they were created.
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| 10. QUOD ILLA RATIO SIT QUAEDAM RERUM LOCUTIO, SICUT FABER PRIUS APUD SE DICIT, QUOD FACTURUS EST.
| 10. This reason is an expression of things, just as a craftsman first tells himself what he is going to make.
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| Illa autem rerum forma, quae in eius ratione res creandas praecedebat: quid aliud est quam rerum quaedam in ipsa ratione locutio, veluti cum faber facturus aliquod suae artis opus prius illud intra se dicit mentis conceptione? Mentis autem sive rationis locutionem hic intelligo, non cum voces rerum significativae cogitantur sed cum res ipsae vel futurae vel iam existentes acie cogitationis in mente conspiciuntur.
| But this model of things, which preceded their creation in the thought of the creator, what else is it than a kind of expression of these things in his thought itself; just as when an artisan is about to make something after the manner of his craft, he first expresses it to himself through a concept? But by the expression of the mind or reason I mean, here, not the conception of words signifying the objects, but the general view in the mind, by the vision of conception, of the objects themselves, whether destined to be, or already existing.
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| Frequenti namque usu cognoscitur, quia rem unam tripliciter loqui possumus. Aut enim res loquimur signis sensibilibus, id est quae sensibus corporeis sentiri possunt /25/ sensibiliter utendo; aut eadem signa, quae foris sensibilia sunt, intra nos insensibiliter cogitando; aut nec sensibiliter nec insensibiliter his signis utendo sed res ipsas vel corporum imaginatione vel rationis intellectu pro rerum ipsarum diversitate intus in nostra mente dicendo.
| For, from frequent usage, it is recognised that we can express the same object in three ways. For we express objects either by the sensible use of sensible signs, that is, signs which are perceptible to the bodily senses; or by thinking within ourselves insensibly of these signs which, when outwardly used, are sensible; or not by employing these signs, either sensibly or insensibly, but by expressing the things themselves inwardly in our mind, whether by the power of imagining material bodies or of understanding thought, according to the diversity of these objects themselves.
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| Aliter namque dico hominem, cum eum hoc nomine, quod est 'homo', significo; aliter, cum idem nomen tacens cogito; aliter, cum eum ipsum hominem mens aut per corporis imaginem aut per rationem intuetur. Per corporis quidem imaginem, ut cum eius sensibilem figuram imaginatur; per rationem vero, ut cum eius universalem essentiam, quae est 'animal rationale mortale', cogitat.
| For I express a man in one way, when I signify him by pronouncing these words, a man; in another, when I think of the same words in silence; and in another, when the mind regards the man himself, either through the image of his body, or through the reason; through the image of his body, when the mind imagines his visible form; through the reason, however, when it thinks of his universal essence, which is a rational, mortal animal.
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| Hae vero tres loquendi varietates singulae verbis sui generis constant. Sed illius quam tertiam et ultimam posui locutionis verba, cum de rebus non ignoratis sunt, naturalia sunt et apud omnes gentes sunt eadem. Et quoniam alia omnia verba propter haec sunt inventa: ubi ista sunt, nullum aliud verbum est necessarium ad rem cognoscendam; et ubi ista esse non possunt, nullum aliud est utile ad rem ostendendam.
| Now, the first two kinds of expression are in the language of one’s race. But the words of that kind of expression, which I have put third and last, when they concern objects well known, are natural, and are the same among all nations. And, since all other words owe their invention to these, where these are, no other word is necessary for the recognition of an object, and where they cannot be, no other word is of any use for the description of an object.
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| Possunt etiam non absurde dici tanto veriora, quanto magis rebus quarum sunt verba similia sunt et eas expressius signant. Exceptis namque rebus illis, quibus ipsis utimur pro nominibus suis ad easdem significandas, ut sunt quaedam voces velut 'a' vocalis, exceptis inquam his nullum aliud verbum sic videtur rei simile cuius est verbum, aut sic eam exprimit, quomodo illa similitudo, quae in acie mentis rem ipsam cogitantis exprimitur.
| For, without absurdity, they may also be said to be the truer, the more like they are to the objects to which they correspond, and the more expressively they signify these objects. For, with the exception of those objects, which we employ as their own names, in order to signify them, like certain sounds, the vowel a for instance—with the exception of these, I say, no other word appears so similar to the object to which it is applied, or expresses it as does that likeness which is expressed by the vision of the mind thinking of the object itself.
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| Illud igitur iure dicendum est maxime proprium et principale rei verbum. Quapropter si nulla de qualibet re locutio tantum propinquat rei, quantum illa quae huiusmodi verbis constat, nec aliquid aliud tam simile rei vel futurae vel iam existentis in ratione alicuius potest esse: non immerito videri potest apud summam substantian, talem rerum locutionem et fuisse antequam essent ut per eam fierent, et esse cum facta sunt ut per eam sciantur. /26/
| This last, then, should be called the especially proper and primary word, corresponding to the thing. Hence, if no expression of any object whatever so nearly approaches the object as that expression which consists of this sort of words, nor can there be in the thought of any another word so like the object, whether destined to be, or already existing, not without reason it may be thought that such an expression of objects existed with (apud) the supreme Substance before their creation, that they might be created; and exists, now that they have been created, that they may be known through it.
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| 11. QUOD TAMEN MULTA SIT IN HAC SIMILITUDINE DISSIMILITUDO.
| 11. Nevertheless, in this comparison there is much dissimilarity.
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| Sed quamvis summam substantiam constet prius in se quasi dixisse cunctam creaturam, quam eam secundum eandem et per eandem suam intimam locutionem conderet, quemadmodum faber prius mente concipit quod postea secundum mentis conceptionem opere perficit: multam tamen in hac similitudine intueor dissimilitudinem.
| But, though it is most certain that the supreme Substance expressed, as it were, within itself the whole created world, which it established according to, and through, this same most profound expression, just as an artisan first conceives in his mind what he afterwards actually executes in accordance with his mental concept, yet I see that this analogy is very incomplete.
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| Illa namque nihil omnino aliunde assumpsit, unde vel eorum quae factura erat formam in seipsa compingeret, vel ea ipsa hoc quod sunt perficeret. Faber vero penitus nec mente potest aliquid corporeum imaginando concipere, nisi id quod aut totum simul aut per partes ex aliquibus rebus aliquomodo iam didicit; nec opus mente conceptum perficere, si desit aut materia aut aliquid sine quo opus praecogitatum fieri non possit. Quamquam enim homo tale aliquod animal possit cogitando sive pingendo quale nusquam sit confingere: nequaquam tamen hoc facere valet, nisi componendo in eo partes, quas ex rebus alias cognitis in memoriam attraxit.
| For the supreme Substance took absolutely nothing from any other source, whence it might either frame a model in itself, or make its creatures what they are; while the artisan is wholly unable to conceive in his imagination any bodily thing, except what he has in some way learned from external objects, whether all at once, or part by part; nor can he perform the work mentally conceived, if there is a lack of material, or of anything without which a work premeditated cannot be performed. For, though a man can, by meditation or representation, frame the idea of some sort of animal, such as has no existence; yet, by no means has he the power to do this, except by uniting in this idea the parts that he has gathered in his memory from objects known externally.
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| Quare in hoc differunt ab invicem illae in creatrice substantia et in fabro suorum operum faciendorum intimae locutiones, quod illa nec assumpta nec adinta aliunde sed prima et sola causa sufficere potuit suo artifici ad suum opus perficiendum, ista vero nec prima nec sola nec sufficiens est ad suum incipiendum. Quapropter ea quae per illam creata sunt, omnino non sunt aliquid quod non sunt per: illam; quae vero fiunt per istam, penitus non essent, nisi essent aliquid quod non sunt per ipsam.
| Hence, in this respect, these inner expressions of the works they are to create differ in the creative substance and in the artisan: that the former expression, without being taken or aided from any external source, but as first and sole cause, could suffice the Artificer for the performance of his work, while the latter is neither first, nor sole, nor sufficient, cause for the inception of the artisan’s work. Therefore, whatever has been created through the former expression is only what it is through that expression, while whatever has been created through the latter would not exist at all, unless it were something that it is not through this expression itself.
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| 12. QUOD HAEC SUMMAE ESSENTIAE LOCUTIO SIT SUMMA ESSENTIA.
| 12. The Expression of the Supreme Being is the Supreme Being.
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| Sed cum pariter ratione docente certum sit, quia quidquid summa substantia fecit, non fecit per aliud quam per semetipsam, et quidquid fecit, per suam intimam locutionem fecit, sive singula singulis verbis, sive potius uno verbo simul omnia dicendo: quid magis necessarium videri potest, quam hanc summae essentiae locutionem non esse aliud quam summam 3 essentiam? Non igitur negligenter praetereundam huius locutionis considerationem puto; sed priusquam de illa possit tractari diligenter, eiusdem summae substantiae proprietates aliquas studiose investigandas existimo. /27/
| But since, as our reasoning shows, it is equally certain that whatever the supreme Substance created, it created through nothing other than itself; and whatever it created, it created through its own most intimate expression, whether separately, by the utterance of separate words, or all at once, by the utterance of one word; what conclusion can be more evidently necessary, than that this expression of the supreme Being is no other than the supreme Being? Therefore, the consideration of this expression should not, in my opinion, be carelessly passed over. But before it can be discussed, I think some of the properties of this supreme Substance should be diligently and earnestly investigated.
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| 13. QUOD, SICUT OMNIA PER SUMMAM ESSENTIAM FACTA SUNT, ITA VIGEANT PER IPSAM.
| 13. Just as all things were made through the Supreme Being, so they are sustained through it.
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| Constat ergo per summam naturam esse factum, quidquid non est idem illi. Dubium autem non nisi irrationabili menti esse potest, quod cuncta quae facta sunt, eodem ipso sustinente vigent et perseuerant esse quamdiu sunt, quo faciente de nihilo habent esse quod sunt. Simili namque per omnia ratione qua collectum est omnia quae sunt esse per unum aliquid, unde ipsum solum est per seipsum et alia per aliud, simili inquam ratione potest probari quia quaecumque vigent per unum aliquid vigent, unde illud solum viget per seipsum et alia per aliud.
| It is certain, then, that through the supreme Nature whatever is not identical with it has been created. But no rational mind can doubt that all creatures live and continue to exist, so long as they do exist, by the sustenance afforded by that very Being through whose creative act they are endowed with the existence that they have. For, by a like course of reasoning to that by which it has been gathered that all existing beings exist through some one being, hence that being alone exists through itself, and others through another than themselves—by a like course of reasoning, I say, it can be proved that whatever things live, live through some one being; hence that being alone lives through itself, and others through another than themselves.
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| Quod quondam aliter esse non potest, nisi ut ea quae sunt facta uigeant per aliud, et id a quo sunt facta vigeat per seipsum: necesse est ut, sicut nihil factum est nisi per creatricem praesentem essentiam, ita nihil vigeat nisi per eiusdem servatricem praesentiam.
| But, since it cannot but be that those things which have been created live through another, and that by which they have been created lives through itself, necessarily, just as nothing has been created except through the creative, present Being, so nothing lives except through its preserving presence.
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| 14. QUOD ILLA SIT IN OMNIBUS ET PER OMNIA, ET OMNIA SINT EX ILLA ET PER ILLAM ET IN ILLA.
| 14. The Supreme Being exists in all things and through all things; and all things exist from it, through it, and in it.
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| Quod si ita est, immo quia ex necessitate sic est consequitur ut, ubi ipsa non est, nihil sit. Ubique igitur est et per omnia et in omnibus. At quondam absurdum est, ut scilicet, quemadmodum nullatenus aliquid creatum potest exire creantis et foventis immensitatem, sic creans et fovens nequaquam valeat aliquomodo excedere factorum universitatem: liquet quondam ipsa est, quae cuncta alia portat et superat, claudit et penetrat. Si igitur haec illis quae superius sunt inventa iungantur: eadem est, quae in omnibus est et per omnia, et ex qua et per quam et in qua omnia. /28/
| But if this is true—rather, since this must be true, it follows that, where this Being is not, nothing is. It is, then, everywhere, and throughout all things, and in all. But seeing that it is manifestly absurd that as any created being can in no wise exceed the immeasurableness of what creates and cherishes it, so the creative and cherishing Being cannot, in anyway, exceed the sum of the things it has created; it is clear that this Being itself, is what supports and surpasses, includes and permeates all other things. If we unite this truth with the truths already discovered, we find it is this same Being which is in all and through all, and from which, and through which, and in which, all exist.
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